The imperative to coordinate international economic relations was one of the fundamental lessons learned from the inter-war great depression and the profound military conflicts that ensued, first in East Asia in the 1930s and then in the global war of 1939-45. Famously, Keynes criticised the punitive economic peace settlement after the Great War of [1914][1915][1916][1917][1918][1919] for creating the conditions for renewed economic and political conflict.
forethought in the design of a lasting peace, the need for an independent arbiter to overcome nationalist tendencies (and to avoid domination by a single state) and the importance of economic cooperation for political cohesion and peace. 5 Like their predecessors after the First World War, the consensus among planners in the 1940s was that a pegged exchange rate system that stabilised the prices of national currencies offered the best prospect for predicable and efficient international trade and payments, and therefore the best prospect to reap the gains from trade and ensure prosperity for beleaguered populations. 6 Given the perils of the interwar gold standard, a stable international payments system was considered a vital foundation on which to promote freer and non-discriminatory trade. Without convertible currencies at stable exchange rates, the international trading system could not be rebuilt along a multilateral system that would ensure equal status for all partners, and the greatest freedom to exploit the gains from trade through international specialisation for mutual benefit. After the protectionism and conflict of the interwar period, economic and commercial cooperation was considered vital to a sustained peace. But there were limits to the extent of economic integration that was supportable in nation states committed to ambitious plans for popular welfare programmes, growth and full employment that mitigated against the devolution of sovereignty required by economic integration. which would provide the leadership and coordination of the system, but the underlying mechanics were flawed. 9 The war had not yet officially ended, but it was clear that the economic damage had been considerable due to the diversion of resources, the dislocation of markets both nationally and internationally and the reshaping of economic power. The
Bretton Woods delegates recognised the need for a period of transition from the end of the war before the controls on convertibility of currencies at stable exchange rates could be removed, but they underestimated the length of this transition. Instead of a swift adoption of the requirements for open multilateral trade, the wartime institutions that focused on regional systems had to persist.
For Britain, the empire and the Commonwealth this meant that the controls protecting the international role of sterling before and during the war were continued. Convertibility was extended only to the central banks of a group of countries that agreed to peg their exchange rate to sterling and economise on their use of dollars and other foreign exchange by imposing controls on their residents. : 1931 -1939 , Cambridge, 1981 . 11 A. Cairncross and B. Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline: the devaluations of 1931 , 1949 and 1967 , Blackwell, Oxford, 1983 . For an overview of the post-war international economic relations that provide a context for this paper see C. R. Schenk, International Economic Relations since 1945 , Routledge, 2011 open and unbinding network that adapted to the changing balance of influence in the international economic system. It conferred benefits on the British at its centre, but also for the participants themselves in an environment of complex and changing global economic relations. and each of the 34 members of the sterling area. The following sections will address each of these periods in turn.
I The Sterling Area in the 1950s
As part of the war effort, British expenditure in the Commonwealth and empire was increasingly paid for through the accumulation of British government securities by the creditor. This resulted in exceptionally large war-related liabilities by the end of 1945 concentrated in the South Asian colonies that achieved independence in the late 1940s;
India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The accumulation of external sterling liabilities exceeded the foreign exchange reserves held in the Bank of England by about four times, so clearly allowing this sterling to be converted to dollars or other foreign exchange had to be prevented. There followed a series of bilateral negotiations with substantial sterling holders through the five years after the end of the War to mutually agree the pace of convertibility and spending of these wartime accumulations of sterling assets.
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As a result of spending by Britain's largest creditors and accumulations by others in the primary product boom of the early 1950s, the geographic distribution of national holdings of sterling was transformed. Figure 1 shows 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 The immediate post-war years were characterised by tight exchange controls on convertibility for all European currencies, so sterling was not exceptional in this respect.
However, the use of sterling in international payments by third countries combined with the large volume wartime debts made controls on sterling's convertibility a particular focus of Anglo-American relations after the war. 13 As a quid pro quo for the July 1946 loan of $3.75 billion, the US insisted that sterling should be convertible within one year to ensure timely progress toward the multilateral payments system devised at Bretton Woods. In the end, the drain on the central reserves in 
II Sterling Area in the 1960s
Despite the exchange control network operated by members of the sterling area, the global convertibility of sterling was greatly enhanced by the formal liberalisation of European payments from the end of 1958. Very soon thereafter, the foundation of the pegged exchange rate began to erode with a loss of confidence in the gold value of the US dollar.
Since most other currencies were pegged either to the dollar or indirectly to the dollar through sterling, the basis of the Bretton Woods system was under threat. This danger drew the major central banks into a formal coordinated support mechanism to support the gold price in the London market from 1961, the so-called Gold Pool. : 1930-1973 Nigeria and Malaysia who were substantial holders of sterling reserves. Although they kept their currencies pegged to sterling through the decade and retained the bulk of their reserves in sterling, the institutional foundations for a more independent policy were established.
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As an example of this process, Figure 2 shows the changes in the role of sterling in the international economic relations of Australia, the largest economy in the overseas sterling area. At the beginning of the 1960s over 90% of reserves were denominated in sterling, but this was rapidly reduced, mainly through retained earnings of US dollars through the decade. On a similar but less dramatic scale the denomination of overseas debt obligations shifted away from sterling and toward the dollar (and DM, SwFr). At the same time, Australia's trade was already in a process of diversifying away from the UK and toward 22 For the foundations of weakening economic links within the empire see, A. Hinds, Britain's Sterling colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939 -1958 , Greenwood Press, 2001 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 In the end, however, the SDR never replaced the role of the dollar in global reserves and the system continued to rely on national currencies as reserve assets. Table 2 1945 -1992 , Cambridge, 2010 .
The devaluation of sterling in 1967 marked a sharp departure for the sterling area and also for the international monetary system more generally. After a repeated series of annual summertime crises in confidence in sterling, the pound was finally depreciated by 14.3% in November 1967. 31 Since national currencies of the sterling area did not generally follow sterling, this depreciated the purchasing power of their foreign exchange reserves.
Nevertheless every country re-pegged to sterling and the sterling area formally continued.
In the aftermath, the British Treasury and government reassessed the role of sterling in the international monetary system and made contingency plans to suspend convertibility and/or float the pound.
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The survival of the sterling area through this crossroads testifies to how loose its relations had become. There was no collective discussion in advance or coordinated response among the sterling area members. The reaction ranged from a quiet but resentful acceptance that 
III Negotiating the end of the Sterling Area
The aftermath of the 1967 devaluation established the institutional process for the end of the sterling area. By this time the economic disintegration had already progressed for most members and the continuation of the sterling area might be viewed as a relic of the immediate post-war period that was difficult to dispense with. From 1968 the strategy for Britain as well as for overseas members of the sterling area was clearly to manage disengagement while avoiding a tipping point that would push sterling into collapse.
Despite the new avenues for international borrowing that emerged from the mid-1960s
London continued to be the main capital market for sterling area governments. Preferred access for sterling area countries was expected to be abandoned when Britain joined the EEC, but sterling area governments were not willing to anticipate this unwelcome eventuality by unilaterally removing themselves from the sterling area. foreign currency borrowing that affected the reserves would not be included in the calculation of the MSP for the first three months, so the sterling agreement would not restrict access to other capital markets. After being negotiated by Australia, this side letter agreement was then extended to other sterling area countries. Table 3 shows the range of countries with which the British government was able to secure bilateral contracts and the level of the minimum sterling proportion. In most cases this reflected the status quo ante and so prevented further diversification after the debacle of the devaluation of 1967. UK exchange control. However, the benefits that drew the partners together had eroded to such an extent that the system had to be stabilised through contractual arrangements.
The focus of sterling area government strategy was on the ability to borrow and retaining exchange rate stability. As the global system based on the dollar floundered from the collapse of the Gold Pool in March 1968 and US inflation increased, shifting their pegged exchange rates from sterling to the dollar did not seem an attractive option. In August 1971, President Nixon suspended gold convertibility and threatened trade sanctions unless Japan, West Germany and other currencies were revalued against the dollar. The US Administration thus forced a general realignment of exchange rates to increase the competitiveness of US production and combat the deficit. President Nixon's ultimatum, accompanied by the removal of support for the US exchange rate, marked the culmination of two years of US deliberation over how to reform their role in the international monetary system. 36 When the pegged exchange rate system was restored in December 1971, the margins between sterling and the dollar were widened, which left sterling area members with a potentially larger band against the US dollar. Australia and New Zealand chose at this time to shift their exchange rate peg to the dollar in order to minimise the volatility against this currency. Table 4 shows that several other members of the sterling area followed.
Malaysia and Singapore retained the peg to the pound since they were in the midst of a complicated disentanglement of their own monetary union. 37 The Middle Eastern states also retained sterling as their anchor currency given the operations of UK oil companies and the substantial share of oil royalties still paid in sterling.
36 Gavin, Gold, dollars and power. Schenk, Decline, pp. 317-29. A. H. Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume II, Book Two, 1970 -1986 , Chicago, 2009 MSPs were reduced further and the trigger was shifted to the value of the effective exchange rate rather than the bilateral dollar exchange rate.
IV Conclusions
Monetary integration has complex and profound political facets, as has been exposed most starkly in the Eurozone crises of 2010. While monetary union among sovereign states is therefore historically unusual, greater integration of economies has been sought through pegged exchange rate regimes which confer the benefits of policy credibility (if the anchor economy is stable) combined with a plausible exit strategy should circumstances change. Of course, the periodic readjustments that characterised the postwar decades showed that the discretionary element of pegged rates tended to undermine the credibility of the peg and promoted speculation once international capital flows were liberalised. While the sterling area was not an example of monetary integration, it did provide a sustained framework for international monetary relations among a diverse group of large and small, high and low income per capita economies for thirty years. Based on pegged exchange rates, freer capital flows and some elements of policy coordination (in the early years), the sterling area was an important element in the post-war international monetary system. It emerged from the collection of countries that had pegged to sterling in the storm of the interwar depression and from the controls introduced as part of Britain's economic war effort. In the immediate post-war years the operation and rationale for the sterling area was closely identified with the accumulation of substantial British war debts, but from the mid-1950s the character of the system began to change into one of mutual benefit.
That the sterling area persisted for so long through such a transformation of the international monetary system is remarkable. The advantages that the sterling area generated for overseas members, for Britain and for other stakeholders in the global system (including USA and the G10) were instrumental in determining the institutional supports that allowed it to persist. From 1952 it was not a closed system of tightly integrated members. Nor was it the forum for significant coordination of policy. Instead, it offered a source of stability in uncertain times, both for the exchange rate regime and for access to international borrowing. As the economic focus of the members of this network turned to Europe, Japan and the USA, the ties that bound the system together weakened and it relied increasingly on the support from third parties. Unlike 1931 or 1949, members of the sterling area did not follow the devaluation of sterling against the dollar in 1967 and from 1968 the sterling area was redefined by formalised agreements to retain a proportion of reserves in sterling. The main enduring element of the original sterling area was the continued importance of access to the London capital market, but even this eroded as capital markets in Europe and the USA became more competitive. Eliminating the sterling area in 1972 was in the end a mere footnote to the more profound shift in British policy
